Supply Chain Coordination Mechanisms of Coal Power Enterprises Under Renewable Energy Quota System: A Perspective of Game Analysis

Abstract

Renewable energy quota system plays an important role in cultivating renewable energy markets and ensuring renewable energy power generation. It has become an important policy tool to resolve regional differences in renewable energy resource endowments and promote energy structure transformation over the world at the macro level. However, the key to ensuring the implementation of renewable energy quota system is to smoothly coordinate the decision-making of industrial chain of coal power enterprises at the micro level. From the perspective of game analysis, this paper compares the supply chain coordination game between traditional coal power enterprises and renewable energy enterprises by establishing game theory models to analyze the difference between decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making, showing that renewable energy enterprises and traditional coal power enterprises can achieve the optimal profits and the overall supply chain can achieve the best carbon emission reduction effect under centralized decision-making. Further, this paper proposes to use the supply chain coordination mechanisms of revenue sharing, cost allocation and revenue sharing + cost allocation between renewable energy enterprises and traditional coal power enterprises to effectively promote the implementation of renewable energy quota system.

Keywords: renewable energy quota system, supply chain of coal power enterprises, coordination mechanism, game analysis