Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: The Political and Normative Context

Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 629-54, 2004

27 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2003 Last revised: 25 Aug 2010

Gregory Shaffer

University of California, Irvine School of Law

Date Written: August 1, 2003

Abstract

This article makes four primary points regarding the issue of parliamentary oversight of WTO rule-making. First, we need a conceptual framework to assess the tradeoffs between different mechanisms for ensuring oversight, including parliamentary oversight, of the WTO. No institutional mechanism is perfect. All proposed mechanisms should be assessed in terms of how well they permit parties to participate in decision-making that affects them in a relatively unbiased manner compared to other realistic, non-idealized institutional alternatives. This analytical framework can be termed "comparative institutional analysis."

Suggested Citation

Shaffer, Gregory, Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: The Political and Normative Context (August 1, 2003). Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 629-54, 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=434420 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.434420

Gregory C. Shaffer (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine School of Law ( email )

401 E. Peltason Dr.
Ste. 1000
Irvine, CA 92612
United States

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