Dynamic One-Sided Matching

We introduce a solution concept for dynamic one-sided matching models, called the Dynamic Core. The Dynamic Core is defined for a general class of dynamic markets where agents and objects arrive over time, and objects can be privately or collectively owned. We prove that the Dynamic Core is not empty and discuss the relation with the static notions of Core and Strong Core. We show that the output of a dynamic extension of the Top Trading Cycle algorithm, the Intertemporal Top Trading Cycle (ITTC), is in the Dynamic Core and the mechanism induced by the ITTC is efficient and group strategy-proof. In private economies the output of the ITTC can be supported as a dynamic competitive equilibrium.

Keywords: Dynamic Matching, One-sided Market, Stability, Dynamic Core, Intertemporal Top Trading Cycle

JEL Classification: C71,C78,D47

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Nicolò, Antonio and Salmaso, Pietro and Saulle, Riccardo, Dynamic One-Sided Matching (February 8, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4352130 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4352130