Does Voluntary Disclosure of Polarizing Information Make Polarization Deeper? An Online Experiment on Russo-Ukrainian War

37 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2023

See all articles by Philipp Chapkovski

Philipp Chapkovski

University of Duisburg-Essen - Institute of Political Science

Alexei Zakharov

Yale University - Jackson Institute for Global Affairs

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 12, 2023

Abstract

Does the animosity toward a holder of an opposite political opinion or the behavior toward someone whose opinion on a divisive issue is unknown depends on whether that opinion was disclosed or withheld voluntarily? In order to study this question, we conducted a pre-registered study in Russia, measuring the pro-war dictators' behavior towards their partners with aligned or conflicting views on the war in Ukraine using give-or-take modification of Dictator Game. In the presence of a large polarisation gap (outgroup discrimination), we did not find that intentional vs. unintentional disclosure of the recipients' positions affected the transfers of the dictators; at the same time, dictators' beliefs about the share of war supporters among experiment participants and the donations made by other dictators were causally affected. Our study is the first one to consider this dimension of social interactions, and contributes to the quickly growing literature on political polarisation.

Keywords: disclosure, transparency, polarization, dictator game, war in Ukraine, Russia

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D74, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Chapkovski, Philipp and Zakharov, Alexei, Does Voluntary Disclosure of Polarizing Information Make Polarization Deeper? An Online Experiment on Russo-Ukrainian War (February 12, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4355956 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4355956

Philipp Chapkovski (Contact Author)

University of Duisburg-Essen - Institute of Political Science ( email )

Lotharstrasse 65
Duisburg, D-47057
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uni-due.de/politik/chapkovski.php

Alexei Zakharov

Yale University - Jackson Institute for Global Affairs ( email )

CT
United States

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