Assigning Work Tasks to Small Teams

45 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2023

See all articles by Antonio Nicolò

Antonio Nicolò

University of Padua - Department of Economics; University of Manchester

Pietro Salmaso

University of Padua - Department of Economics

Arunava Sen

University of Malaga - Department of Economics

Sonal Yadav

University of Liverpool Management School; Department of Economics, Umea University; University of Liverpool Management School

Date Written: November 7, 2022

Abstract

We study the problem of an organization that has a large number of potential tasks and has to choose which tasks to handle and which pair of experts assign to each of them. We propose a mechanism that generates a Pareto-efficient assignment in the weak core and is group strategy-proof. The assignment rule generated by this mechanism is characterized by four axioms: Pareto-eciency, the Weak Core property, Restricted Maskin Monotonicity and Invariance with respect to Deleted Links. The last two axioms are invariance properties with respect to speci c preference changes.

Keywords: Matching, Core, Pareto-efficiency, Strategy-proofness

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D71

Suggested Citation

Nicolò, Antonio and Salmaso, Pietro and Sen, Arunava and Yadav, Sonal, Assigning Work Tasks to Small Teams (November 7, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4358126 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4358126

Antonio Nicolò

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

University of Manchester ( email )

Arthur Lewis Building
Oxford Road
Manchester, M13 9PL
United Kingdom

Pietro Salmaso (Contact Author)

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

Arunava Sen

University of Malaga - Department of Economics ( email )

Sonal Yadav

University of Liverpool Management School ( email )

Department of Economics, Umea University ( email )

Samhallsvetarhuset, Biblioteksgrand 6
Umea universitet
Umea, PA Vasterbotten 90187
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/sonalyadav736/home

University of Liverpool Management School ( email )

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