Job Scope and Motivation under Informal Incentives

18 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2023

See all articles by Charles Angelucci

Charles Angelucci

MIT Sloan

Roi Orzach

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 17, 2023

Abstract

We model the relationship between the number of tasks assigned to an employee and a firm's ability to motivate effort through informal performance-based bonuses. We show that assigning multiple tasks gives the firm a greater range of performance levels that can be rewarded. The firm takes advantage of this by designing equally motivating, flatter, and hence more credible incentives.

Keywords: Relational Contract, Managerial Incentives, Relationship Scope

JEL Classification: C73, L14, L2, M52

Suggested Citation

Angelucci, Charles and Orzach, Roi, Job Scope and Motivation under Informal Incentives (February 17, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4362222 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4362222

Charles Angelucci (Contact Author)

MIT Sloan ( email )

100 Main Street
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Roi Orzach

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

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