Strategic Regulatory Non-Disclosure: The Case of the Missing Form D

Abstract

We document that the majority of venture-capital backed financing rounds are not accompanied by a Form D filing. We show that filing behavior is predictable and is related to both the ability to fly below the radar and the benefits of withholding information. Financing rounds that are harder to hide, larger offerings and those previously covered by media, are more likely file a Form D while financing rounds by firms with greater proprietary information, early stage firms or companies in biotech, pharmaceutical, and high tech industries, are less likely to file a Form D. We document one adverse outcome to the filing of a Form D, patent litigation, and show that protection from this type of litigation through the enactment of anti-patent trolling laws subsequently increases the rate of filing. Firms are less likely to file a Form D once the form is required to be filed on Edgar. Finally, we note that reliance on Regulation D is stronger as the firm nears an exit from the private market. Our results suggests that some firms view even minimal disclosure and regulatory oversight as costly.

Keywords: venture capital, disclosure, regulation, Form D, private firms, proprietary information, capital raising, securities issuance

JEL Classification: g24, g38, k22, g3