A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications

University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2000-2

Posted: 12 Oct 2003

See all articles by Christopher J. Ellis

Christopher J. Ellis

University of Oregon - Department of Economics

Anne van den Nouweland

University of Oregon - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 2000

Abstract

We construct a market based mechanism that induces players in a non-cooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problems of "The Tragedy of the Commons" and "R&D Spillovers in Duopoly".

Keywords: Cooperation, Externalities, Spillovers, Eficiency

JEL Classification: C72, D62, H40

Suggested Citation

Ellis, Christopher J. and van den Nouweland, Anne, A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications (February 2000). University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2000-2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=436522

Christopher J. Ellis (Contact Author)

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

Eugene, OR 97403
United States

Anne Van den Nouweland

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

Eugene, OR 97403
United States
541-346-1267 (Phone)
541-346-1243 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/annevandennouweland/

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