Harmonizing Federal Immunities

38 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2023 Last revised: 17 Apr 2023

See all articles by Dev Ranjan

Dev Ranjan

University of Virginia School of Law

Date Written: February 20, 2023

Abstract

When a federal employee is charged with a state crime based on conduct that was within their official responsibilities, the United States Constitution protects them from prosecution through Supremacy Clause immunity. This immunity was developed by the Supreme Court in a small set of cases from around the turn of the twentieth century, but no Supreme Court cases have mentioned it since. Generally, as lower courts have construed it, it is a highly protective standard. This Note questions that standard by attempting to re-align Supremacy Clause immunity with another federal immunity that also derives from the Supremacy Clause: federal tax immunity. Until the mid-twentieth century, federal tax immunity cases protected the federal government from almost any state-tax-related burdens, even indirect ones. But in 1937, the Supreme Court abruptly changed course and overruled a century of its previous precedents. As a result, federal tax immunity today has only a shadow of its previous force. In relating these two immunities to each other, this Note aims to shine light on Supremacy Clause immunity as a doctrine based on an outdated conception of the role of federal courts in our federalist system. It ties the Court’s shift in federal tax immunity to a broader philosophical transformation that also appeared in other doctrines, like those governing the application of the Tenth Amendment and preemption. And it shows that Supremacy Clause immunity as it currently stands is the sour note in an otherwise consistent harmony of federalist relationships.

Keywords: supremacy clause immunity, neagle, federal tax immunity, preemption

Suggested Citation

Ranjan, Dev, Harmonizing Federal Immunities (February 20, 2023). 109 Va. L. Rev. 427, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4365231

Dev Ranjan (Contact Author)

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

United States

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