Board Structures Around the World: An Experimental Investigation

51 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2003

See all articles by Ann B. Gillette

Ann B. Gillette

Kennesaw State University - Michael J. Coles College of Business; Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Michael J. Rebello

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Thomas H. Noe

University of Oxford - Said Business School; University of Oxford - Balliol College; Bank of Finland; European Corporate Governance Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 18, 2004

Abstract

We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently, but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsidercontrolled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider, adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria.

Keywords: outside directors, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G0, G3

Suggested Citation

Gillette, Ann Brewer and Rebello, Michael J. and Noe, Thomas H., Board Structures Around the World: An Experimental Investigation (August 18, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=436683 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.436683

Ann Brewer Gillette (Contact Author)

Kennesaw State University - Michael J. Coles College of Business ( email )

1000 Chastain Road
Kennesaw, GA 30144
United States

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

1000 Peachtree Street N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309-4470
United States

Michael J. Rebello

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States

Thomas H. Noe

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom

University of Oxford - Balliol College ( email )

Broad St
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom

Bank of Finland ( email )

P.O. Box 160
FIN-00101 Helsinki
Finland

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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