Optimal Risk Management with Reinsurance and its Counterparty Risk Hedging

30 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2023

See all articles by Yuxia Huang

Yuxia Huang

Central University of Finance and Economics

Yichun Chi

Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE)

Tao Hu

Central University of Finance and Economics

Abstract

In this paper, we revisit the study of an optimal risk management strategy for an insurer who wants to maximize the expected utility by purchasing reinsurance and managing reinsurance counterparty risk with a default-free hedging instrument, where the reinsurance premium is calculated by the expected value principle and the price of the hedging instrument equals to the expected payoff plus a proportional loading. Different to previous studies, we exclude ex post moral hazard by imposing the no-sabotage condition on reinsurance contracts and derive the optimal strategy analytically. Surprisingly, we find that the stop-loss reinsurance is always optimal. The form of optimal hedging payoff, however, changes with different cost advantage between reinsurance and the hedging instrument. We further show that full risk transfer is optimal if and only if both reinsurance pricing and the hedging price are fair. Finally, numerical analyses are conducted to illustrate the effects of some interesting factors on the optimal risk management strategy.

Keywords: Counterparty risk, Hedging, Mossin's theorem, No-sabotage condition, Optimal reinsurance design

Suggested Citation

Huang, Yuxia and Chi, Yichun and Hu, Tao, Optimal Risk Management with Reinsurance and its Counterparty Risk Hedging. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4367067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4367067

Yuxia Huang (Contact Author)

Central University of Finance and Economics ( email )

770 Middle Road
Dresden, ME 04342
United States

Yichun Chi

Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE) ( email )

39 South College Road
Haidian District
Beijing, Beijing 100081
China

Tao Hu

Central University of Finance and Economics ( email )

770 Middle Road
Dresden, ME 04342
United States

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