Cable Ownership Rules: A Bargaining Theory Approach

16 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2003

See all articles by Nodir Adilov

Nodir Adilov

Purdue University Fort Wayne

Peter J. Alexander

Federal Communications Commission

Date Written: January 12, 2003

Abstract

The Federal Communications Commission exercises broad regulatory authority over merger activity in the cable broadcast industry. In previous rule-makings and court proceedings, the Commission has emphasized concern about the potential for collusive behavior among cable operators in considering merger applications and horizontal ownership limits. Recent court rulings direct the Commission to develop plausible alternative economic approaches, and we explore one such alternative approach, specifically bargaining theory. We suggest that bargaining theory may offer greater insights than the collusion hypothesis for guiding policy-makers in constructing appropriate ownership limits.

JEL Classification: L40, L41, L44, L51, L82

Suggested Citation

Adilov, Nodir and Alexander, Peter J., Cable Ownership Rules: A Bargaining Theory Approach (January 12, 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=436962 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.436962

Nodir Adilov

Purdue University Fort Wayne ( email )

2101 E. COLISEUM BLVD, NH 260C
FORT WAYNE, IN 46805
United States
2604816497 (Phone)

Peter J. Alexander (Contact Author)

Federal Communications Commission ( email )

Washington, DC 20554
United States

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