Who Cares About Auditor Reputation?

43 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2003

Abstract

I provide evidence on the demand for auditor reputation by examining the defections of Arthur Andersen LLP's clients following the accounting scandals and criminal conviction marring the auditor's reputation in 2002. About 95 percent of clients in my sample did not switch auditors until after Andersen was indicted for criminal misconduct regarding its failed audit of Enron Corp. I test whether the timing of client defections and the choice of a new auditor are consistent with managers' incentives to mitigate potentially costly information and agency problems. I find that clients defected sooner, mostly to another Big 5 auditor, if they were more visible in the capital markets; such clients attracted more analysts and press coverage, had larger institutional ownership and share turnover, and raised more cash in recent security issues. However, my proxies for agency conflicts - managerial ownership and financial leverage - are not associated with the timing of defections or the choice of new auditor. Overall, my study suggests that firms more visible in the capital markets tend to be more concerned about engaging highly reputable auditors, consistent with such firms trying to build and preserve their own reputations for credible financial reporting.

Keywords: Audit quality, Reputation,Financial reporting credibility,Capital markets, visibility

JEL Classification: G1, M41, M42

Suggested Citation

Barton, Jan, Who Cares About Auditor Reputation?. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=436967 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.436967

Jan Barton (Contact Author)

Emory University ( email )

1300 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322-2722
United States
404-727-6398 (Phone)
404-727-6313 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,525
Abstract Views
7,605
Rank
24,360
PlumX Metrics