Reciprocity Over Time: Do Employees Respond More to Kind or Unkind Controls?

51 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2023

See all articles by Jordan Samet

Jordan Samet

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business

Karl Schuhmacher

Emory University - Goizueta Business School

Kristy L. Towry

Emory University

Jacob Zureich

Lehigh University - College of Business

Date Written: September 24, 2024

Abstract

Reciprocity plays a critical role in the way employees respond to managerial control decisions. The current consensus is that employees punish managers for implementing unkind controls (negative reciprocity) more than they reward managers for implementing kind controls (positive reciprocity). We challenge this consensus. Prior research focuses on settings that emphasize employees’ immediate reciprocal responses. However, in the workplace, employees often respond over long periods of time to sticky control decisions (e.g., pay, budgets, decision-rights). Focusing on these long-term settings, we predict and find that, while negative reciprocity is initially stronger than positive reciprocity, it also fades more over time than positive reciprocity. This differential fading is so pronounced in our setting that positive reciprocity is stronger overall in the long run. Thus, in long-term settings, positive responses to kind controls may play a more important role than negative responses to unkind controls. Our results inform managerial decisions about the use of kind versus unkind controls and suggest potential long-term benefits of pay disparity and other policies that treat employees differentially.

Keywords: Reciprocity, Management Controls, Emotions, Norms, Experimental Economics

Suggested Citation

Samet, Jordan and Schuhmacher, Karl and Towry, Kristy L. and Zureich, Jacob, Reciprocity Over Time: Do Employees Respond More to Kind or Unkind Controls? (September 24, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4371449 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4371449

Jordan Samet

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business ( email )

1309 E 10th Street, Hodge Hall 4100
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Karl Schuhmacher

Emory University - Goizueta Business School ( email )

1300 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322-2722
United States

Kristy L. Towry

Emory University ( email )

Goizueta Business School
1300 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727-4895 (Phone)

Jacob Zureich (Contact Author)

Lehigh University - College of Business ( email )

Bethlehem, PA 18015
United States

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