Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors

24 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2003  

Robert Pozen

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Students; Brookings Institution

Date Written: August 2003

Abstract

This paper applies the cost-benefit framework for shareholder activism, utilized by most institutional investors, to the five alternative approaches to shareholder participation in director elections suggested by the ABA Task Force on this subject. I show that none of them would likely generate benefits exceeding its costs, although there are worthwhile components of several alternatives suggested by the ABA. I argue that some of the problems involved in the alternatives under considerations could be avoided by allowing institutional investors to cumulate their votes for one director nominee. However, cumulative voting is not permitted by most company charters, which may be changed only if the company's directors put forward a charter amendment for a vote by its shareholders.

JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Pozen, Robert, Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors (August 2003). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 429. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=437160 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.437160

Robert Pozen (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Students ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02139
United States

Brookings Institution ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

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