Influencing Public Trust in Central Banks: Identifying Who Is Open to New Information

Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, No.45 - 2022

51 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2023

See all articles by Bernd Hayo

Bernd Hayo

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics

Pierre-Guillaume Meon

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB); Université Robert Schuman Strasbourg III

Date Written: 2022

Abstract

Using a randomized controlled trial in a 2018 survey of a representative sample of the German population, we study whether providing information about the European Central Bank’s (ECB) inflation record in comparison to its inflation target affects people’s trust in the central bank. In the treatment, administered to half of the roughly 2000 respondents, a graph of the annual inflation rate in the euro area from 1999 to 2017 and the ECB’s 2% inflation target was shown to respondents. We find that the treatment has, on average, no significant effect on the level of trust respondents have in the ECB or on the distribution of survey answers. However, the treatment increases trust in the ECB among respondents who report no preference for any political party. Within this group, the effect is strongest among those who reported biased beliefs about the inflation rate but knew that price stability is the ECB’s objective and those who reported a low level of subjective and objective knowledge about monetary policy.

Keywords: Central bank trust, European Central Bank, Central bank communication, Monetary policy, Germany, Household survey, RCT

JEL Classification: E52, E58, Z1

Suggested Citation

Hayo, Bernd and Meon, Pierre-Guillaume, Influencing Public Trust in Central Banks: Identifying Who Is Open to New Information ( 2022). Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, No.45 - 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4373398 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4373398

Bernd Hayo (Contact Author)

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

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Pierre-Guillaume Meon

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) ( email )

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Belgium

Université Robert Schuman Strasbourg III ( email )

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Institut d'Etudes Politiques
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France
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33 3 88 41 77 78 (Fax)

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