Multibillion-Dollar Tax Questions

58 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2023 Last revised: 24 Feb 2024

See all articles by James Alm

James Alm

Tulane University

Jay A. Soled

Rutgers University

Kathleen DeLaney Thomas

University of North Carolina School of Law

Date Written: March 1, 2023

Abstract

Tax compliance in the United States historically hovers in the 80 percent range, costing the nation approximately half a trillion dollars annually in uncollected tax revenue. To foster greater tax compliance, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) should employ whatever tools are at its disposal. Standard deterrence theory argues that increasing the audit rate and imposing stiffer penalties would foster greater tax compliance. There are political headwinds, however, that strongly suggest that these approaches are not currently viable. Instead, there is a low-cost method that could yield greater tax compliance. Drawing on recent and compelling social science research, the IRS should ask more information-revealing questions on tax returns. By engaging in this important exercise of strategic inquiries, dual benefits are likely to emerge: taxpayers would be more likely to report honestly to avoid acts of commission (e.g., lying); and the IRS would be in a better strategic position because it would possess additional, relevant information on taxpayer activities.

Keywords: tax, tax policy, taxation, behavioral law and economics, behavioral economics, nudges, tax compliance

JEL Classification: E62, H20, H21, H23, H25, H26, H29, K34, D81, A12, K42

Suggested Citation

Alm, James and Soled, Jay and Thomas, Kathleen DeLaney, Multibillion-Dollar Tax Questions (March 1, 2023). 84 Ohio State Law Journal 895, UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 4375216, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4375216 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4375216

James Alm

Tulane University ( email )

United States
5048628344 (Phone)

Jay Soled

Rutgers University ( email )

1 Washington Park
Newark, NJ 07901-1825
United States
(973) 353-1727 (Phone)

Kathleen DeLaney Thomas (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina School of Law ( email )

Van Hecke-Wettach Hall, 160 Ridge Road
CB #3380
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3380
United States
919-843-7630 (Phone)

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