Investor Driven Climate Accountability

39 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2023 Last revised: 11 Apr 2023

See all articles by Kimberly Houser

Kimberly Houser

Ostrom Workshop on Data Management and Information Governance, Indiana University; Digital Democracy Lab, William & Mary Law School

Lindsay Sain Jones

Terry College of Business, University of Georgia

Date Written: March 6, 2023

Abstract

As the world confronts an urgent climate crisis, corporations are under increasing pressure to take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In place of genuine effort, many public companies have made climate pledges that they are not on track to fulfill. Further, despite the very real financial risks corporations face as temperatures rise, climate-related risks are often under-disclosed. While the SEC has proposed rules that could begin to address corporate accountability, formidable legal challenges are expected. Recognizing that top-down responses may not be effective, shareholders could opt to take matters into their own hands through direct action. This Article explores how investors may take the reins to hold corporations accountable for misstating their climate efforts and failing to disclose their climate risks. After describing top-down measures and their inherent weaknesses, we investigate the viability of private Rule 10b-5 claims, shareholder derivative suits, and shareholder proposals. Because some companies are focused on preparing for or lobbying against potential regulation, they may not be attuned to the risk of such investor-driven actions. After analyzing these bottom-up approaches to climate accountability, we provide a series of recommendations as to how corporations can respond to these efforts.

Keywords: climate change; securities fraud; derivative lawsuits; shareholder activism

Suggested Citation

Houser, Kimberly and Jones, Lindsay, Investor Driven Climate Accountability (March 6, 2023). UC Davis Law Review, Vol. 57, 2024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4378275 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4378275

Kimberly Houser

Ostrom Workshop on Data Management and Information Governance, Indiana University ( email )

Indiana University
Bloomington Indiana, IN
United States

Digital Democracy Lab, William & Mary Law School

PO Box 8795
William and Mary Law School
Williamsburg, VA 23187
United States

Lindsay Jones (Contact Author)

Terry College of Business, University of Georgia ( email )

610 S. Lumpkin Street
Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States
7065424290 (Phone)

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