Mandated Data Sharing in Hybrid Marketplaces

46 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2023

See all articles by Federico Navarra

Federico Navarra

University of Padua

Flavio Pino

Politecnico di Torino

Luca Sandrini

Budapest University of Technology and Economics

Date Written: March 16, 2023

Abstract

Considering a monopolistic hybrid platform, we investigate the effect of a mandated data-sharing policy on market outcomes across different data functionalities (price discrimination and cost reduction) and different market structures (perfect and imperfect competition). We find that mandated data sharing has no effects on welfare if data can be used to price discriminate consumers who buy homogeneous goods, while mandated sharing of cost-reducing data improves welfare by lowering the average price in the markets. When goods are horizontally differentiated, data sharing with price discrimination (cost reduction) may instead negatively (positively) affect consumers. We argue that in markets where competition is softer, mandatory data sharing may damage the very agents it is intended to protect, namely consumers and (efficient) sellers.

Keywords: hybrid platforms, data sharing, vertical integration

JEL Classification: D42, L12, L41

Suggested Citation

Navarra, Federico and Pino, Flavio and Sandrini, Luca, Mandated Data Sharing in Hybrid Marketplaces (March 16, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4390587 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4390587

Federico Navarra

University of Padua ( email )

Via 8 Febbraio
Padova, 2-35122
Italy

Flavio Pino

Politecnico di Torino ( email )

Torino
Italy

Luca Sandrini (Contact Author)

Budapest University of Technology and Economics ( email )

Budafoki ut 8.
Budapest, 1111
Hungary

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