International Conflict, Defense Spending and the Size of Countries

56 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 1996 Last revised: 3 Oct 2010

See all articles by Alberto F. Alesina

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Enrico Spolaore

Tufts University - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 1996

Abstract

This paper provides a formal model of endogenous country formation and of choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. The model is consistent with three observations. First, secessions and, more generally, break-up of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflict. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the break-up of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace divided -- i.e., the reduction in the defense spending in a more peaceful world -- is limited by the process of country break-up.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Spolaore, Enrico, International Conflict, Defense Spending and the Size of Countries (August 1996). NBER Working Paper No. w5694. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4393

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
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617-495-8388 (Phone)
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Enrico Spolaore

Tufts University - Department of Economics ( email )

Medford, MA 02155
United States

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