Exchange-Rate Management Viewed as Tax Policies

35 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2004

See all articles by Jacob A. Frenkel

Jacob A. Frenkel

Merrill Lynch & Co. - Sovereign Advisory Group and Global Financial Institutions Group; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Assaf Razin

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 1988

Abstract

The paper develops an analytical framework which demonstrates that the various forms of exchange-rate management are equivalent to corresponding tax policies. To highlight the salient issues, we consider two specific categories of exchange-rate policies. The first is a dual exchange-rate regime, which separates exchange rates for commercial and for financial transactions, and the second is a unified exchange-rate system in which the country unilaterally pegs its exchange rate at the same rate for all transactions. We show that the dual exchange rate policies can be usefully cast as distortionary taxes on international borrowing, and a unified pegged exchange-rate policies can be usefully cast as lump-sum tax cum subsidy policies. The equivalence between the various characteristics of exchange-rate management and tax management suggests that exchange-rate analysis could be usefully incorporated into the broader framework of the analysis of fiscal policies. A two-country model of the world economy is used to demonstrate the international transmission mechanism of these policies.

Suggested Citation

Frenkel, Jacob A. and Razin, Assaf, Exchange-Rate Management Viewed as Tax Policies (July 1988). NBER Working Paper No. w2653. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=439580

Jacob A. Frenkel

Merrill Lynch & Co. - Sovereign Advisory Group and Global Financial Institutions Group

New York, NY
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Assaf Razin (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 7303 (Phone)
+972 3 640 9908 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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