Imperial Presidency versus Fragmented Executive? Unilateral Trade Measures and Executive Accountability in the European Union and the United States

Abstract

Faced with a changing geopolitical environment, the European Union has embarked on a legislative
programme to upgrade its unilateral trade instruments toolbox. By reforming existing instruments (trade defence) and by adding new instruments to the European Commission’s toolbox (foreign subsidies instrument, international procurement instrument, anti-coercion instrument…), the EU legislature is significantly strengthening the position of the Commission in the governance of unilateral trade policy in the EU. This development raises questions of accountability. By means of a comparative analysis of executive accountability in unilateral trade policy in the United States and the EU, I describe this transformation of executive power in the EU, and I argue that a further strengthening of democratic accountability mechanisms is needed to match the Commission’s growing responsibilities in this underexamined corner of EU trade policy.

Keywords: Geopoliticization, geoeconomics, economic statecraft, open strategic autonomy, anti-coercion instrument, unilateral trade measures, autonomous trade measures, United States, European Union, democratic accountability, democratic legitimacy, rule of law, separation of powers, checks and balances, s