Nudging or Nagging: The Perils of Persuasion

Abstract

Over the past few years, organizations and policy-makers have enthusiastically resorted to persuasion appeals to align individuals' behavior with their objectives. Despite the widespread use of appeals and persuasion techniques in various fields, their effectiveness has often been inconsistent and subject to debate. A central unanswered question is whether the effect of appeals depends on individuals' predisposition to follow externally-imposed rules. In this paper, we provide experimental evidence on the heterogeneous effect of appeals from a long-term (35 days) online Common Pool Resource game. We find that rule followers comply more with the content of the appeal, while rule breakers react against it. Reactance to appeals among rule breakers emerge after some time and is robust even after controlling for social preferences, personal and social norms. Our findings have important implications for policymakers, practitioners, and researchers seeking to promote behavior change and achieve social outcomes. By leveraging insights from behavioral science and experimental research, we can design more effective interventions that account for individual variation and maximize their impact.

Keywords: persuasion, nudges, backfiring, rule following

JEL Classification: D7, D9