The (Geo)Politics of Controlling Shareholders

29 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2023 Last revised: 11 Oct 2023

See all articles by Curtis J. Milhaupt

Curtis J. Milhaupt

Stanford Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute

Date Written: March 31, 2023

Abstract

Corporate governance scholarship on controlling shareholders has focused almost exclusively on shareholder wealth diversion (“tunneling”) and creation (“idiosyncratic vision”). This essay shifts the focus to the fusion of political and economic power inherent in corporate control, and the wide-ranging geo-strategic and domestic political implications of this fusion beyond the boundaries of the firm. The approach is illustrated with examples from a variety of corporate capitalist systems operating globally today, and a survey of the numerous policy domains in which firms with controlling shareholders are key protagonists: national security, economic sanctions, stock exchange competition, corporate influence on domestic political systems, and ESG. Particularly in a period of heightened concern for corporate externalities and non-financial interests of stakeholders, analysis of the (geo)political dimensions of corporate control should be within the purview of corporate law scholars.

Suggested Citation

Milhaupt, Curtis J., The (Geo)Politics of Controlling Shareholders (March 31, 2023). European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 696/2023, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 580, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4406516 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4406516

Curtis J. Milhaupt (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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