Financial Statements not Required*

80 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2023 Last revised: 31 Jul 2024

See all articles by Michael Minnis

Michael Minnis

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Andrew Sutherland

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Felix Vetter

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Date Written: July 31, 2024

Abstract

Using a dataset covering 3 million commercial borrower financial statements, we document a substantial, nearly monotonic decline in banks' use of attested financial statements (AFS) in lending over the past two decades. Two market forces help explain this trend. First, technological advances provide lenders with access to a growing array of borrower information sources that can substitute for AFS. Second, banks are increasingly competing with nonbank lenders that rely less on AFS in screening and monitoring. Our results illustrate how technology adoption and changes in credit market structure can render AFS less efficient than alternative information sources for screening and monitoring.

Keywords: JEL Classification: G21, G23, M41, M42, D82, G30, O31 banks, lending standards, financial statements, auditing, private firms, SME lending, nonbank lending, fintech

JEL Classification: G21, G23, M41, M42, D82, G30, O31

Suggested Citation

Minnis, Michael and Sutherland, Andrew and Vetter, Felix, Financial Statements not Required* (July 31, 2024). MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 6843-23, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4408334 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4408334

Michael Minnis

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Andrew Sutherland (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology ( email )

100 Main Street
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://mitsloan.mit.edu/faculty/directory/andrew-gordon-sutherland

Felix Vetter

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

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