Antitrust Merger Control as a Regulatory Sandbox

The Journal of Corporation Law, Forthcoming

USC CLASS Research Paper No. 23-14

15 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2023 Last revised: 25 Jul 2023

See all articles by D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

USC Gould School of Law; USC Marshall School of Business

Date Written: April 4, 2023

Abstract

The regulatory sandbox model has proven to be relatively effective in reducing regulatory uncertainty and improving investment and innovation outcomes. The antitrust regulatory sandbox is generally a success, even if at the margins there are important changes that can be made. The problem with the current Biden administration approach has been to reduce transparency and to change the procedural norms for the regulatory sandbox. Substantive standards are also at a disconnect with stated standards in the horizontal merger guidelines. Combined, the breakdown of the antitrust regulatory sandbox threatens innovation, creates additional costs to the merger system, and chills the types of mergers that should be made. To the extent that the agencies want to change antitrust practice, they should do so in a way that modifies the sandbox in a way that does not fundamentally alter its nature.

Keywords: mergers, antitrust, regulatory sandbox

JEL Classification: K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel, Antitrust Merger Control as a Regulatory Sandbox (April 4, 2023). The Journal of Corporation Law, Forthcoming, USC CLASS Research Paper No. 23-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4410082 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4410082

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

USC Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

USC Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

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