Deposit Franchise Runs

87 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2023 Last revised: 13 Sep 2024

See all articles by Itamar Drechsler

Itamar Drechsler

Wharton School, Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alexi Savov

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Philipp Schnabl

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Olivier Wang

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 5, 2023

Abstract

We model a new type of bank run, a deposit franchise run. Banks pay below-market rates on deposits, which makes the deposit franchise a valuable asset. For a bank to keep this value, deposits must stay in the bank; if they leave, their value is lost to the bank. This makes the deposit franchise a runnable asset. Unlike Diamond-Dybvig runs, deposit franchise runs can occur even if the bank's loans are fully liquid. Since the deposit franchise value increases with interest rates, a run is more harmful, and hence more likely, when rates are high. To avoid runs, banks can shorten the duration of their assets, but this can make them insolvent if interest rates fall. Avoiding both runs and insolvency requires additional capital in proportion to the value of the uninsured portion of the deposit franchise. We use our model to estimate deposit franchise values and show how to identify vulnerable banks in the context of the 2023 Regional Bank Crisis.

Suggested Citation

Drechsler, Itamar and Savov, Alexi and Schnabl, Philipp and Wang, Olivier, Deposit Franchise Runs (April 5, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4411127 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4411127

Itamar Drechsler

Wharton School, Department of Finance ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/idrechsl/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Alexi Savov (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Philipp Schnabl

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

HOME PAGE: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/pschnabl/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Olivier Wang

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.olivierwang.com

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