Credit Markets and the Visible Hand: The Discount Window and the Macroeconomy

59 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2023 Last revised: 13 Apr 2023

See all articles by Peter Conti-Brown

Peter Conti-Brown

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; Brookings Institution

David A. Skeel

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: January 01, 2024

Abstract

In times of crisis such as the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic central banks throughout the world engage in interventions with lasting effects on financial markets and the macroeconomy, for better and worse. The negative political consequences of these interventions—fears of politicizing central banking and inflationary concerns about dramatic interventions among them—can dampen the enthusiasm for such interventions early in the face of crisis. This dynamic creates a dilemma for the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, causing it to eschew interventions beyond monetary policy until the crisis has already crashed, at which point the Fed moves into every aspect of policy throughout the economy. This Article highlights the inadequacy of this dynamic. Sole reliance on monetary policy is insufficient in the face of growing crisis, while the Fed’s vast emergency lending facilities face ever stiffer political, inflationary, and equity concerns. The Article advocates instead for a new approach to macroeconomic stability, not just through monetary policy or emergency interventions, but through judicious use of the sleeping giant of Fed policy, the bank-intermediated discount window. Focusing on the problematic credit market for debtors-in-possession in the midst ofbankruptcy, the Article suggests a reformed system that safeguards the Fed, supports small and medium-sized enterprises, and stabilizes the macroeconomy without exposing the system to the pockets of instability that the Fed’s overreliance on dramatic intervention can do.

Keywords: Financial markets, Economic crisis, macroeconomic stability, dysfunctional market, Federal Reserve, Bailout Regulation, debt market, Fed’s intermediation, DIP-dedicated lending, corporate bankruptcies, DIP Discount Window, fiscal-monetary response.

JEL Classification: E58, E63, G38, G28, K22

Suggested Citation

Conti-Brown, Peter and Skeel, David A., Credit Markets and the Visible Hand: The Discount Window and the Macroeconomy (January 01, 2024). U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 23-16, Yale Journal on Regulation, volume 41, issue 1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4411715

Peter Conti-Brown (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Brookings Institution ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

David A. Skeel

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-573-9859 (Phone)
215-573-2025 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
196
Abstract Views
899
Rank
307,893
PlumX Metrics