Vertical Contracting When Competition for Orders Precedes Procurement

Melbourne Business School Working Paper No. 2003-22

27 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2003

See all articles by Joshua S. Gans

Joshua S. Gans

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; NBER

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 5, 2003

Abstract

This paper reverses the standard order between input supply negotiations and downstream competition and assumes that competition for orders takes place prior to procurement of inputs in a vertical chain. In an environment where procurement negotiations involve no private information and no restrictions on the form of pricing, it is found that oligopolistically competitive outcomes will result despite the presence of an upstream monopolist. It is demonstrated that vertical integration is a means by which the monopolist can leverage its market power downstream to the detriment of consumers. However, it does so, not by foreclosing on independent downstream firms, but by softening the competitive behaviour of its own integrated units. Thus, the paper provides a simple rationale for anti-competitive vertical integration in an environment that respects the usual Chicago school assumptions.

Keywords: vertical contracting, vertical integration, monopolisation, bargaining, competition

JEL Classification: L42

Suggested Citation

Gans, Joshua S., Vertical Contracting When Competition for Orders Precedes Procurement (September 5, 2003). Melbourne Business School Working Paper No. 2003-22. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=441640 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.441640

Joshua S. Gans (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.joshuagans.com

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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