With a Grain of Salt: Uncertain Veracity of External News and Firm Disclosures

62 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2023 Last revised: 21 Oct 2023

See all articles by Jonathan Libgober

Jonathan Libgober

University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Beatrice Michaeli

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

Elyashiv Wiedman

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration

Date Written: January 1, 2023

Abstract

We examine how uncertain veracity of external news influences investor beliefs, market prices and corporate disclosures. Despite assuming independence between the news' veracity and the firm’s endowment with private information, we find that favorable news is taken “with a grain of salt” in equilibrium—more precisely, perceived as less likely veracious—which reinforces investor beliefs that nondisclosing managers are hiding disadvantageous information. Hence more favorable external news could paradoxically lead to lower market valuation. That is, amid management silence, stock prices may be non-monotonic in the positivity of external news. In line with mounting empirical evidence, our analysis implies asymmetric price reactions to news and price declines following firm disclosures. We further predict that external news that is more likely veracious may increase or decrease the probability of disclosure and link these effects to empirically observable characteristics.


Earlier version of this paper is available here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3994932

Keywords: uncertain relevance; voluntary disclosure; asymmetric price reaction; price non-monotonicity; probability of disclosure

JEL Classification: D82, D83, G12

Suggested Citation

Libgober, Jonathan and Michaeli, Beatrice and Wiedman, Elyashiv, With a Grain of Salt: Uncertain Veracity of External News and Firm Disclosures (January 1, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4422628 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4422628

Jonathan Libgober

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Beatrice Michaeli (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )

D410 Anderson Complex
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States

Elyashiv Wiedman

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel

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