The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the Relevance of Conference Calls to Financial Analysts

Posted: 22 Sep 2003

Abstract

This study examines the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on the relevance of company-sponsored conference calls. Measuring relevance by a conference call's ability to improve analyst forecast accuracy and consensus, I find larger improvements in both variables during the period surrounding conference calls in the post-FD era versus the pre-FD era. These findings imply that in the post-FD era relatively more about a firm's upcoming earnings becomes known during conference calls, consistent with FD's success in eliminating selective disclosure.

Keywords: regulation fair disclosure, conference calls, selective disclosure, forecast accuracy, forecast consensus

JEL Classification: G10, G29, G38, M41, M45

Suggested Citation

Irani, Afshad Jeevan, The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the Relevance of Conference Calls to Financial Analysts. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 22, No. 1. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=442440

Afshad Jeevan Irani (Contact Author)

Washington and Lee University ( email )

204 West Washington Street
Lexington, VA 24450
United States
5404588628 (Phone)

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