What Does Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Chester I. Barnard Have to Do with Quiet Quitting?

American Journal of Management, 23(1), 2023, 1-11, 2023

11 Pages Posted: 15 May 2023

See all articles by Reginald Bell

Reginald Bell

Prairie View A&M University

Daniel Kennebrew

Prairie View A&M University

Date Written: April 26, 2023

Abstract

Media sources have blended aspects of social loafing with aspects of the free rider problem which they now call “quiet quitting.” Social loafing is decades old theory from the social psychology literature, used to explain why individuals work less hard in groups. The free rider problem is a theory, mainly from economics, that explains the insatiable desire of people who do not contribute to the cost of production for goods and services which they consume. Employees’ perceptions of a firm’s social contract inform their understanding of psychological contracts, and inevitably their interpretation of fairness in job descriptions. Managers who understand Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “Social Contract” and Chester I. Barnard’s “Theory of Authority” will be better able to anticipate and mitigate against the collective will of employees. In this article, we present three recommendations that, if implemented correctly, will help managers resolve problems leading to quiet quitting.

Keywords: authority, Chester I. Barnard, contract, free rider, power, quitting, Rousseau, social loafing

JEL Classification: A10, B10, B20, B30

Suggested Citation

Bell, Reginald and Kennebrew, Daniel, What Does Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Chester I. Barnard Have to Do with Quiet Quitting? (April 26, 2023). American Journal of Management, 23(1), 2023, 1-11, 2023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4429700

Reginald Bell (Contact Author)

Prairie View A&M University ( email )

Prairie View, TX
United States
9362619247 (Phone)
77433-6048 (Fax)

Daniel Kennebrew

Prairie View A&M University ( email )

PO Box 188
Prairie View, TX 77446-0188
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
268
Abstract Views
763
Rank
219,333
PlumX Metrics