Corporate Gender Quotas Under the Lens: Evidence from California Senate Bill No. 826

34 Pages Posted: 13 May 2023 Last revised: 11 Oct 2023

See all articles by Mingying Cheng

Mingying Cheng

Fordham University - Gabelli School of Business

Kose John

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Iftekhar Hasan

Fordham University ; Bank of Finland; University of Sydney

Stefano Manfredonia

Fordham University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 26, 2022

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of California’s gender quotas on corporate strategy and the representation of women in managerial positions. We find that affected firms adopt a long-term orientation by increasing their expenditures on research and development, organizational capital, and intangible assets and improving their corporate environmental performance and culture. The expenditures are financed through firms’ internal resources and do not lead to an overall increase in corporate indebtedness. In addition to the law’s direct effect on the presence of women on boards of directors, we provide evidence that it has also increased the presence of women in other managerial positions within affected corporations and has had spillover effects on other states through firms’ internal networks of establishments. Our results emphasize several social and economic benefits resulting from implementing this law previously ignored in the literature.

Keywords: Gender Quotas; Board Diversity; Corporate Policies; Women Leadership

JEL Classification: G30; O16; J16

Suggested Citation

Cheng, Mingying and John, Kose and Hasan, Iftekhar and Manfredonia, Stefano, Corporate Gender Quotas Under the Lens: Evidence from California Senate Bill No. 826 (November 26, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4430318 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4430318

Mingying Cheng

Fordham University - Gabelli School of Business ( email )

113 West 60th Street
Bronx, NY 10458
United States

Kose John

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

Iftekhar Hasan

Fordham University ( email )

45 COLUMBUS AVENUE
GBA-5TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, NY 10023
United States

Bank of Finland ( email )

P.O. Box 160
Helsinki 00101
Finland

University of Sydney ( email )

P.O. Box H58
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia

Stefano Manfredonia (Contact Author)

Fordham University ( email )

113 West 60th Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

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