RIP Japanese Legal Studies? A Comment

6 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2023 Last revised: 28 Jun 2023

See all articles by Curtis J. Milhaupt

Curtis J. Milhaupt

Stanford Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute

Date Written: June 21, 2023

Abstract

Should we lament the decline of Japanese legal studies in the United States? If so, why?
Reacting to Professor Feldman’s recent article, “The Death of Japanese Legal Studies? An American Perspective,” I argue that the most important pedagogical merits of the field have little to do with the potential to make practical contributions to law reform in Japan or the United States. Rather, the reason to lament waning interest in Japanese legal studies in U.S. law schools is lost opportunity to experience the pure joy of (intellectual) travel.

The most important lessons we can learn from the study of Japanese law are insights into the forces that shape law and other forms of social governance everywhere, the role of lawyers in different societies, and the distinctiveness – indeed, radical outlier status – of the U.S. legal system in comparison to virtually every other “rule of law” society, and certainly in comparison to that of Japan.

Ultimately, the strongest case for studying Japanese law outside its home country is genuine intellectual fascination – a quality of mind that is the opposite of "Orientalism" as famously decried by Edward Said -- one that sparks self-reflection, humility about one’s own circumstances and creations, empathy, and imaginative thinking about new possibilities. Stepping outside the tunnel-vision-inducing program that is U.S. legal education, even momentarily in a course on Japanese law, is a powerful antidote to legal chauvinism of the sort that infects even some members of our highest court.

Keywords: Japanese law, comparative law, legal education

JEL Classification: P00

Suggested Citation

Milhaupt, Curtis J., RIP Japanese Legal Studies? A Comment (June 21, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4430436 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4430436

Curtis J. Milhaupt (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

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Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

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1000 Brussels
Belgium

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