Bank Runs and Design Flaws of Deposit Insurance

Abstract

Deposit insurance systems are designed to balance the benefits of preventing bank runs and protecting ordinary savers against the costs of reduced market discipline and potential burdens on taxpayers. Design flaws of deposit insurance make the benefits too low and the costs too high. This paper presents an example in which solvent banks can effectively manage runs, depositors discipline banks to a reasonable extent, and taxpayers have a fair deal. It has three key features: the bank’s authority to activate deposit insurance early, a coinsurance scheme that transfer money from those who run on solvent banks to those who stay put, and a shareholder position for taxpayers. Early activation of deposit insurance prevents fire sales of assets and provides opportunities to verify the bank’s solvency. The coinsurance scheme weakens the incentive to run and strengthens the incentive to hold on to their accounts. As shareholders, taxpayers receive dividends in normal times in exchange for large payouts in catastrophic events.

Keywords: bank runs, deposit insurance, market discipline

JEL Classification: G21, G28