A Dynare Toolbox for Social Learning Expectations

37 Pages Posted: 14 May 2023 Last revised: 25 Mar 2024

See all articles by Alex Grimaud

Alex Grimaud

Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB); TU Wien

Isabelle Salle

Government of Canada - Bank of Canada; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Gauthier Vermandel

CMAP, Ecole polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris; LEDa, Paris-Dauphine & PSL Universities; Banque de France

Date Written: 22 02, 2024

Abstract

Social learning (SL) is a behavioral model in which expectations and the resulting aggregate dynamics stem from the interactions of a large number of heterogeneous agents. Nonetheless, this framework has so far lacked a parsimonious development with a general-solution method. This paper bridges this gap and introduces a Dynare toolbox to solve any linear state-space model with SL expectations, opening up a wide range of potential applications. As an illustration, optimal monetary policy rules are studied in a microfounded New Keynesian (NK) model under SL and rational expectations (RE).

Keywords: Inflation targeting, Monetary policy, Heterogeneous expectations

JEL Classification: E32, E52, E58, E71

Suggested Citation

Grimaud, Alex and Salle, Isabelle and Vermandel, Gauthier, A Dynare Toolbox for Social Learning Expectations (22 02, 2024). Université Paris-Dauphine Research Paper No. 4437177, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4437177 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4437177

Alex Grimaud (Contact Author)

Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) ( email )

Otto-Wagner-Platz 3, PO Box 61
Vienna,
1010 Vienna, A-1011
Austria

TU Wien ( email )

Isabelle Salle

Government of Canada - Bank of Canada ( email )

234 Wellington Street
Ontario, Ottawa K1A 0G9
Canada

University of Amsterdam

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Gauthier Vermandel

CMAP, Ecole polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris ( email )

Route de Saclay
Palaiseau, 91128
France

LEDa, Paris-Dauphine & PSL Universities ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Banque de France ( email )

Paris
France

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