Private Peers’ Disclosure Transparency and Public Firms’ Information Environment

53 Pages Posted: 16 May 2023 Last revised: 19 Mar 2024

See all articles by Bianca Beyer

Bianca Beyer

Aalto University School of Business

Vanessa Flagmeier

Georg-August-University of Goettingen

Urska Kosi

Paderborn University; University of Ljubljana - Faculty of Economics

Date Written: November 30, 2022

Abstract

This study examines how private peers’ disclosure transparency affects public firms’ information environment. Exploiting the variation in private firms’ importance and the availability of their financial information, we document lower analyst forecast quality when private peer importance in the respective industry is higher. We further find that this association is driven by opaque private peers and primarily manifests when public focal firms’ information availability is relatively poor. Finally, a difference-in-differences analysis shows increased forecast activity for public focal firms around transparent private peers’ disclosure dates. Overall, our findings are aligned with the cost-benefit trade-off that analysts face when acquiring and integrating information. By documenting the relevance of private peers’ disclosure transparency for public firms’ information environment, we contribute to the debate about disclosure mandates for private firms.

Keywords: private firms, disclosure mandates, information externalities, information enrivonment, peer disclosureanalyst forecasts

JEL Classification: D82, G14, M41

Suggested Citation

Beyer, Bianca and Flagmeier, Vanessa and Kosi, Urska, Private Peers’ Disclosure Transparency and Public Firms’ Information Environment (November 30, 2022). TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 143, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4438123 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4438123

Bianca Beyer

Aalto University School of Business ( email )

Aalto University School of Business
PO Box 21210
Aalto, FI-00076
Finland

Vanessa Flagmeier (Contact Author)

Georg-August-University of Goettingen ( email )

Germany

Urska Kosi

Paderborn University ( email )

Warburger Str. 100
Paderborn, 33098
Germany

University of Ljubljana - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Kardeljeva ploscad 17
Ljubljana, 1000
Slovenia

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