Contractual Howlers: A Russian Bond Case Study

28 Pages Posted: 8 May 2023 Last revised: 19 Sep 2023

See all articles by Robert E. Scott

Robert E. Scott

Columbia University - Law School

Stephen J. Choi

New York University School of Law

Mitu Gulati

University of Virginia School of Law

Date Written: May 4, 2023

Abstract

Both theorists and courts commonly assume that high-dollar financial contracts between sophisticated parties are free of linguistic errors: sophisticated parties, the thinking goes, will carefully express their shared intentions and eliminate any troublesome gaps and glitches.

Consistent with this assumption, most courts interpret the language of commercial contracts literally according to the plain or ordinary meaning of the words in the agreement. An examination of contracts governing Russian bonds outstanding in 2022, however, reveals a large number of troublesome contractual gaps and glitches. We refer to these linguistic irregularities as “howlers” to highlight the significant litigation risks they create. In this paper we use interviews with market participants to assess the causes of the contractual howlers we observe in the Russian bonds. The presence of howlers undermines the core assumption that justifies the literal interpretive approach used by courts for contracts between sophisticated parties.

Keywords: sovereign bonds, contracts, howlers, landmines, Russia

JEL Classification: K12, K22, H63, H81

Suggested Citation

Scott, Robert E. and Choi, Stephen J. and Gulati, Mitu, Contractual Howlers: A Russian Bond Case Study (May 4, 2023). University of Toronto Law Journal (Forthcoming), Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2023-40, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2023-10, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 23-53, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4438641

Robert E. Scott

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-0072 (Phone)

Stephen J. Choi (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

Mitu Gulati

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

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