The Political Economy of Finance

Posted: 17 Oct 2003

See all articles by Marco Pagano

Marco Pagano

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics; Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF); Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Paolo F. Volpin

City University London - Faculty of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Abstract

The regulations that shape the design and operations of corporations and credit and securities markets differ vastly from country to country. In addition, similar regulations are often unequally enforced in different countries. Economists still have an imperfect understanding of why these international differences exist and of whether they tend to persist over time. However, a recent strand of research has shown that some progress on these issues can be made using the approach of the new political economy, which models regulation and its enforcement as the result of the balance of power between social and economic constituencies. In this paper we offer a first assessment of the results and potential of this approach in three fields: corporate finance, banking, and securities markets.

JEL Classification: G28, G38, K22, K42

Suggested Citation

Pagano, Marco and Volpin, Paolo F., The Political Economy of Finance. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2001, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=443961

Marco Pagano (Contact Author)

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

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Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

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Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

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Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

Paolo F. Volpin

City University London - Faculty of Finance ( email )

London, EC2Y 8HB
Great Britain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

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