Power Asymmetry in Repeated Play of Provision and Appropriation Games

33 Pages Posted: 8 May 2023

See all articles by James C. Cox

James C. Cox

Georgia State University

Vjollca Sadiraj

Georgia State University

James M. Walker

Indiana University Bloomington

Abstract

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of power asymmetry on resolution of social dilemmas in repeated play of linear public good games. The experiment uses a 2X2 design that crosses power symmetry or asymmetry in games with positive (provision) or negative (appropriation) externalities. Our data suggest that power asymmetry has a detrimental effect on voluntary allocations to a public good, with the effect being more pronounced in the asymmetric-power appropriation game. Allocations to a public good increase with “social” income, which is inconsistent with allocations by different individuals being strategic substitutes. With power asymmetry, second movers earn more than first movers in the appropriation game but not in the provision game.

Keywords: Key Words: Social Dilemmas, Public Goods, Symmetric and Asymmetric Games, Repeated Games

Suggested Citation

Cox, James C. and Sadiraj, Vjollca and Walker, James M., Power Asymmetry in Repeated Play of Provision and Appropriation Games. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4441636 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4441636

James C. Cox

Georgia State University

Vjollca Sadiraj

Georgia State University

35 Broad Street
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083
United States

James M. Walker (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington ( email )

Dept of Biology
100 South Indiana Ave.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

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