Voting Schemes in DAO Governance

Forthcoming in Annual Review of Fintech

21 Pages Posted: 10 May 2023

See all articles by Qinxu Ding

Qinxu Ding

Singapore University of Social Sciences

Weibiao Xu

Singapore University of Social Sciences

Zhiguo Wang

Singapore University of Social Sciences

David Kuo Chuen Lee

Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS); National Univeristy of Singapore; Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Date Written: May 9, 2023

Abstract

This article aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the different voting schemes used in DAO governance. We will examine the various features of these schemes and compare their differences. We propose a new hypothetical voting mechanism specifically designed for decentralized and permissionless DAO governance. This new scheme, which incorporates incentive designs, is intended to be more efficient than existing schemes and can be easily adapted to a permissioned scenario. Through this examination and proposal, we hope to contribute to the ongoing discourse on how to govern decentralized autonomous organizations effectively.

Keywords: Voting process, DAO, Governance

JEL Classification: D02, D70, G30, Z0

Suggested Citation

Ding, Qinxu and Xu, Weibiao and Wang, Zhiguo and Lee, David Kuo Chuen, Voting Schemes in DAO Governance (May 9, 2023). Forthcoming in Annual Review of Fintech, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4442470 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4442470

Qinxu Ding

Singapore University of Social Sciences ( email )

461 Clementi Road
599491
Singapore

Weibiao Xu

Singapore University of Social Sciences ( email )

461 Clementi Road
599491
Singapore

Zhiguo Wang

Singapore University of Social Sciences ( email )

461 Clementi Road
599491
Singapore

David Kuo Chuen Lee (Contact Author)

Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) ( email )

461 Clementi Road
Singapore, 599491
Singapore

National Univeristy of Singapore ( email )

1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics ( email )

Shanghai, 200433
China

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