Organized Crime, Violence and Support for the State

55 Pages Posted: 17 May 2023

See all articles by Gian Maria Campedelli

Gian Maria Campedelli

Università di Trento

Gianmarco Daniele

University of Milan - Faculty of Law; Bocconi University

Andrea FM Martinangeli

Burgundy School of Business; University of Gothenburg - Centre for Collective Action (CeCAR)

Paolo Pinotti

Bocconi University - BAFFI Center on International Markets, Money, and Regulation

Date Written: May 9, 2023

Abstract

Citizens’ support is crucial to effectively combat organized crime. Contrary to prior studies that have identified a negative correlation between victimization and trust in the state, we find that exposinga representative sample of 6,000 individuals in Italy to journalistic images of organized crime-related violence increases trust towards institutions and state performance. We attribute this finding to a "rally around the flag" effect, rather than to the decrease in homicide rates occurring over the last decades – in fact, individuals wrongly believe that homicides have increased during such period. Updating beliefs on the real trend in violence does not appear to modify this relationship. Overall, these findings highlight how exposure to violence, especially when linked to organized groups, might strengthen state support.

Keywords: Organized Crime; Italy; Mafias; Social Trust; Experiments

JEL Classification: D70, D72, H3, O52

Suggested Citation

Campedelli, Gian Maria and Daniele, Gianmarco and Martinangeli, Andrea and Pinotti, Paolo, Organized Crime, Violence and Support for the State (May 9, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4443292 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4443292

Gian Maria Campedelli

Università di Trento ( email )

Via Verdi 26
Trento, TN 38122
Italy

Gianmarco Daniele (Contact Author)

University of Milan - Faculty of Law ( email )

Via Festa del Perdono, 7
20122 Milano
Italy

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Andrea Martinangeli

Burgundy School of Business ( email )

29 Rue Sambin
Dijon, 21000
France

University of Gothenburg - Centre for Collective Action (CeCAR) ( email )

Box 100, S-405 30
Gothenburg
Sweden

Paolo Pinotti

Bocconi University - BAFFI Center on International Markets, Money, and Regulation ( email )

Milano, 20136
Italy

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