Communication Architecture Affects Gender Differences in Negotiation

73 Pages Posted: 17 May 2023 Last revised: 20 Dec 2024

See all articles by Adam Eric Greenberg

Adam Eric Greenberg

Bocconi University - Department of Marketing

Ragan Petrie

Texas A&M University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: December 19, 2024

Abstract

Women tend to face worse outcomes than men in negotiations. Prior work documenting the gender earnings gap in negotiations has primarily focused on hypothetical, face-to-face negotiations in contextualized environments. Given the ubiquity of various methods of communication in everyday life that reveal versus obscure gender, such as chat, phone calls, and video calls in the workplace, we examine the extent to which agender gap in negotiation outcomes varies across settings in which gender is obscured versus revealed. Using context-free, incentivized experiments, we test how the architecture of different virtual communications affects the presence and extent of gender differences in negotiation outcomes. Experimental subjects negotiate over a context-free good in one of five communication modes that mimic naturalistic settings. When the architecture reveals gender (i.e., through video, image, or voice), women earn 6.2% less than men. However, when the architecture obscures gender (i.e., in anonymous messaging or via altered voice), there is no gender earnings gap. We discuss potential mechanisms and implications for efficiency.

Keywords: negotiation, gender earnings gap, communication architecture, unstructured bargaining

JEL Classification: J16, C78, C91

Suggested Citation

Greenberg, Adam Eric and Petrie, Ragan, Communication Architecture Affects Gender Differences in Negotiation (December 19, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4443330 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4443330

Adam Eric Greenberg

Bocconi University - Department of Marketing ( email )

Via Roentgen, 1 (4th floor)
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Ragan Petrie (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University - Department of Economics ( email )

4228 TAMU
College Station, TX 77843-4228
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.raganpetrie.org/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.raganpetrie.org/

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
142
Abstract Views
734
Rank
427,470
PlumX Metrics