Hierarchical Control

23 Pages Posted: 10 May 2023

See all articles by Christopher Li

Christopher Li

Vanderbilt University

Greg Sasso

Emory University

Ian R. Turner

Yale University

Abstract

Theories of political accountability typically focus on voter-politician relationships. However, overall government performance depends on both elected politicians and unelected bureaucrats. Politicians are agents of voters while serving as principals to bureaucrats. We develop a model of electoral accountability in governance hierarchies, treating it as a chain of relational contracts. The problem of optimizing electoral control reduces to a classic static consumer problem, and we illustrate how voter welfare and governance quality respond to changes in the political-economic environment.

Keywords: Electoral accountability, Government hierarchy, bureaucracy, Relational contracts

Suggested Citation

Li, Christopher and Sasso, Greg and Turner, Ian R., Hierarchical Control. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4444412 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4444412

Christopher Li

Vanderbilt University ( email )

Nashville, TN 37235
United States

HOME PAGE: http://christopherli.net

Greg Sasso

Emory University ( email )

201 Dowman Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

Ian R. Turner (Contact Author)

Yale University ( email )

115 Prospect Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

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