Political Uncertainty and Capital Raising Through Private Offerings

47 Pages Posted: 18 May 2023 Last revised: 7 Apr 2025

See all articles by Vladimir I. Ivanov

Vladimir I. Ivanov

US Securities & Exchange Commission

Matthew Wynter

State University of New York, SUNY at Stony Brook University, College of Business

Date Written: April 04, 2025

Abstract

Private offerings raise 15% less capital during the four months preceding local U.S. gubernatorial elections relative to other private offerings issued in the same state and months in other years. The decline is driven by non-VC-backed firms, including those that later go public or get acquired, and concentrated in elections featuring unfamiliar candidates. Proceeds raised during the four months after unfamiliar elections are, however, not different from other periods, implying dead-weight costs. Firm fixed effects and novel event studies indicate that lower issuer quality does not explain the decline. The findings establish that political uncertainty reduces access to private financing.

Keywords: Political Uncertainty; Private Securities Offerings; Venture Capital;, Private Offerings, Venture Capital

JEL Classification: G3, G2, G24, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Ivanov, Vladimir and Wynter, Matthew, Political Uncertainty and Capital Raising Through Private Offerings (April 04, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4444693 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4444693

Vladimir Ivanov

US Securities & Exchange Commission ( email )

Washington, DC
United States
202-551-5307 (Phone)

Matthew Wynter (Contact Author)

State University of New York, SUNY at Stony Brook University, College of Business ( email )

306 Harriman Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794
United States

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