Does Public Firms’ Mandatory IFRS Reporting Crowd Out Private Firms’ Capital Investment?

86 Pages Posted: 13 May 2023

See all articles by Jiancheng (Duncan) Liu

Jiancheng (Duncan) Liu

University of Macau

Wei Shi

Deakin University

Cheng (Colin) Zeng

Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Guochang Zhang

University of Hong Kong

Date Written: May 10, 2023

Abstract

We investigate how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by publicly listed firms in the European Union affects peer private firms. We find that private firms’ capital investment decreases significantly after the IFRS mandate, relative to public firms. Private firms also display decreased investment when benchmarked against firms relatively insulated from the impact of the IFRS mandate, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller in this case. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory IFRS reporting (combined with other reforms), while increasing public firms’ financing and investment, crowds out funding for private firms. The effect is more pronounced for larger private firms and in industries where public peers have greater external financing needs. Our evidence suggests that financial reporting regulations cause shifts in resource allocation in an economy.

Keywords: IFRS; Private Firms; Capital Investment; Investment Responsiveness; Crowding Out

JEL Classification: D62; D78; G18; G31; G32; G38; M41

Suggested Citation

Liu, Jiancheng (Duncan) and Shi, Wei and Zeng, Cheng and Zhang, Guochang, Does Public Firms’ Mandatory IFRS Reporting Crowd Out Private Firms’ Capital Investment? (May 10, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4444795 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4444795

Jiancheng (Duncan) Liu

University of Macau ( email )

University of Macau
Avenida da Universidade, Taipa
Macau

Wei Shi (Contact Author)

Deakin University ( email )

Burwood 3125, VIC
Melbourne, 3125
Australia

Cheng Zeng

Hong Kong Polytechnic University ( email )

11 Yuk Choi Rd
Hung Hom
Hong Kong

Guochang Zhang

University of Hong Kong ( email )

KK Leung Building
Faculty of Business and Economics
Hong Kong
+852 3917 1076 (Phone)

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