Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the Eu's Conciliation Committee

35 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2003

See all articles by Stefan Napel

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Mika Widgren

University of Turku - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: September 2003

Abstract

The European Union (EU) has moved towards bicameralism, making the codecision procedure its most important mechanism for decision making. To gauge if European Parliament (EP) and Council of Ministers (CM) are equally powerful "codecision makers", understanding of the final stage of the procedure - bargaining in the Conciliation Committee - is crucial. Here, EP and CM are assumed to have spatial preferences determined by their respective internal decision mechanisms. Applying bargaining theory to predict interinstitutional agreements in the Conciliation Committee, it turns out that although institutionally the Council and the Parliament are seemingly in a symmetric position, CM has significantly greater influence on EU legislation.

JEL Classification: C70, C78, D70, D72

Suggested Citation

Napel, Stefan and Widgren, Mika T., Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the Eu's Conciliation Committee (September 2003). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1029. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=444520

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Mika T. Widgren (Contact Author)

University of Turku - Department of Economics ( email )

FIN-20500 Turku
Finland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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