Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem

63 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 1996

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

This article evaluates the economics of the Internet and Internet-related software markets, which are heavily driven towards standardization. It suggests that a traditional section 2 antitrust analysis will fail to effectively regulate competition in such a market, particularly if it is directed at structural relief. Instead, the article recommends that section 2 play a limited role in regulating conduct in a standards competition. The article also suggests that private standard-setting may play a procompetitive role in the Internet context, and that section 1 should be relaxed in order to permit such joint activity (within certain limits).

Note: Published in the Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 28, P. 1041, 1996.

JEL Classification: K21, L86

Suggested Citation

Lemley, Mark A., Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem. Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 28, p. 1041, 1996. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=44458 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.44458

Mark A. Lemley (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

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