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Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results


Justin Wolfers


University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics; The Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan; University of Sydney Department of Economics; The Brookings Institution; Peterson Institute for International Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Kiel Institute for the World Economy

August 2003

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 264; Stanford Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 68

Abstract:     
Application of the Coase Theorem to marital bargaining suggests that shifting from a consent divorce regime to no-fault unilateral divorce laws should not affect divorce rates. Each iteration of the empirical literature examining the evolution of divorce rates across U.S. states has yielded different conclusions about the effects of divorce law liberalization. I show that these results reflect a failure to jointly consider both the political endogeneity of these divorce laws and the dynamic response of divorce rates to a shock to the political regime. Taking explicit account of the dynamic response of divorce rates to the policy shock, I find that liberalized divorce laws caused a discernible rise in divorce rates for about a decade, but this increase was substantially reversed over the next decade. That said, this increase explains very little of the rise in the divorce rate over the past half century. Both administrative data on the flow of new divorces, and measures of the stock of divorcees from the census support this conclusion. These results are suggestive of spouses bargaining within marriage, with an eye to their partner's divorce threat.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: divorce rates, family law, unilateral divorce, no-fault divorce, state-specific trends, differences-in-differences, Coase theorem


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Date posted: September 12, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Wolfers, Justin, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results (August 2003). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 264; Stanford Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 68. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=444620 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.444620

Contact Information

Justin Wolfers (Contact Author)
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics ( email )
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The Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan ( email )
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University of Sydney Department of Economics ( email )
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The Brookings Institution ( email )
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Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
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HOME PAGE: http://www.cepr.org/researchers/details/rschcontact.asp?IDENT=157943
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )
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Germany

Kiel Institute for the World Economy ( email )
P.O. Box 4309
Kiel, D-24100
Germany
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