Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis

25 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2003

See all articles by Mark Movsesian

Mark Movsesian

St. John's University School of Law

Date Written: September 12, 2003


This essay explains the WTO's enforcement mechanism in terms of interest group theory. Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, a WTO member that fails to comply with a ruling in a trade dispute is subject to "retaliation" from the complaining member: the complaining member may raise tariffs against the offending member's products. This remedy creates incentives for exporters in the offending country to lobby their government in favor of compliance. As a result, the retaliation remedy promotes compliance without intruding directly on national institutions. It is thus superior to suggested reforms, like direct effect, that would commandeer courts or other national governmental bodies. The retaliation remedy resolves a dilemma at the heart of the world trade regime: how to give the WTO sufficient power to promote global trade without conferring so much power that the organization becomes a threat to sovereignty and representative government.

Keywords: WTO, compliance, interest groups, direct effect

Suggested Citation

Movsesian, Mark, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis (September 12, 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=444640 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.444640

Mark Movsesian (Contact Author)

St. John's University School of Law ( email )

8000 Utopia Parkway
Jamaica, NY 11439
United States
718-990-5650 (Phone)
718-990-2199 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/faculty/profiles/Movsesian

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics